Acknowledgments |
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xi | |
Prologue |
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xiii | |
Part One States and Societies |
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3 | (7) |
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A Model of State-Society Relations |
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10 | (42) |
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Generating High Expectations for States |
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10 | (5) |
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The Drive Toward State Predominance |
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15 | (9) |
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Modeling State-Society Relations |
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24 | (9) |
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States and Weblike Societies |
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33 | (6) |
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States and Strongmen Struggle for Social Control |
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39 | (6) |
Part Two Crisis and Reconsolidation: The Impact of Capitalism and Colonialism |
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45 | (7) |
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The Weakening of Patterns of Social Control |
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52 | (45) |
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Ties to the World Economy |
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52 | (5) |
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57 | (9) |
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66 | (7) |
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New Modes of Transportation |
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73 | (7) |
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Social Change and Social Control |
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80 | (9) |
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Crisis and Institutional Change |
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89 | (4) |
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The Deterioration of Old Social Control |
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93 | (4) |
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Laying the Basis for a Weak State: British Colonialism and the Fragmentation of Social Control in Sierra Leone |
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97 | (45) |
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97 | (5) |
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Political Hegemony and the New Distribution of Social Control |
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102 | (5) |
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Recreating Social Control: Brits and Chiefs |
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107 | (9) |
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The Plural Interests of the British |
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116 | (8) |
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Why Colonial Officials Did Not Seek to Centralize Social Control |
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124 | (5) |
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The Impact of the New Social Structure on Postindependence Politics |
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129 | (6) |
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The State and the New Elite |
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135 | (4) |
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Colonialism, Social Fragmentation, and Weak States |
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139 | (3) |
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Laying the Basis for a Strong State: The British and Zionists in Palestine |
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142 | (39) |
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Variation in the Recreation of Social Control |
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142 | (1) |
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Background to Creation of Jewish Society in Palestine |
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143 | (3) |
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The British Propose a Jewish Agency |
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146 | (5) |
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The Struggle Among the Jews |
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151 | (12) |
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Jewish Autonomy and British Complicity |
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163 | (6) |
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169 | (3) |
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The Conditions for Creating a Strong State |
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172 | (5) |
Part Three The Continuing Impact of an Environment of Conflict on State and Society |
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Introduction to Part Three |
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177 | (4) |
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The Egyptian State Attempts to Transform Egyptian Society |
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181 | (25) |
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The Image of Society Affecting the State |
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181 | (2) |
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Nasser and the Egyptian Land Reform |
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183 | (4) |
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Nasser's Two-Step Process for Building a Strong State |
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187 | (3) |
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The State's Agencies for Concentrating Social Control |
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190 | (2) |
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The Critical Role of the Rich and Middle Peasants |
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192 | (8) |
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Nasser Undermines His Own Agencies |
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200 | (3) |
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The Vicious Cycle of State Failure |
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203 | (3) |
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The Politics of Survival: Why Weak States Cannot Overcome Strong Societies and What Happens to Them as a Result |
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206 | (32) |
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State Leaders and State Agencies |
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206 | (1) |
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The Dilemma of State Leaders |
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207 | (7) |
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214 | (12) |
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State Leaders and Power Centers in Society: The State and Capital |
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226 | (10) |
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State Leaders Reduced to Ruses and Stratagems |
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236 | (2) |
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The Triangle of Accommodation: Implementors, Politicians, and Strongmen |
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238 | (21) |
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238 | (1) |
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Careerism, Risks, and Implementing Policies |
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239 | (6) |
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245 | (2) |
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Accommodation and Capturing the State at the Local Level |
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247 | (9) |
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The Effects of Society on State and State on Society |
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256 | (3) |
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259 | (30) |
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Dislocating Societies: Necessary Conditions for Creating Strong States |
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269 | (2) |
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Sufficient Conditions for Creating Strong States |
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271 | (8) |
Appendixes |
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Appendix A Assessing Social Control |
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279 | (8) |
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Appendix B A Controversy over How Disruptive the Nineteenth Century Really Was |
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287 | (2) |
Index |
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289 | |